Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach by Sara Castellanos & Marco Oviedo
Cu a d e r n o s  d e  eC o n o m í a , Vo l . 45 (ma y o ), p p. 3-28, 2008
Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury 





Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, México
This analysis of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions suggests that the 
uniform format yields higher revenues than the discriminatory format. It applies 
the structural econometric model proposed by Février, Préget, and Visser (2004). 
This model’s main advantage is that it allows us to (i) estimate the parameters 
that characterize the distribution function of the securities’ marginal value and the 
conditional distribution of the signals given the securities’ value; (ii) derive optimal 
bids and equilibrium prices of alternative auction mechanisms; and (iii) compare 
revenues. The uniform format’s revenue superiority seems to be due to market 
uncertainty, defined as an environment with noisier value signals.
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1.  Introduction
In this paper, we apply the structural econometric model of the share auc-
tion proposed by Février, Préget, and Visser (2004) –here after FPV– to analyze 
the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions. Our motivation is twofold. On 
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the one hand, we ought to mention that the intention to maximize the treasury’s 
sales revenue is an important objective; however, due to the huge sums of money 
involved, the sales agencies are very sensitive to the need to avoid unnecessary 
responses to format changes that could drive investors out of the markets1. As 
a result, there have been hardly any “natural experiments” involving auction 
format switches up to now. The treasury securities markets’ survey conducted by 
Bartolini and Cottarelli (1994) reported that within a sample of 77 countries only 
7 of them –Belgium, Tanzania, France, Gambia, Italy, Mexico and the United 
States– had switched format, namely from the uniform to the discriminatory 
format. Furthermore, not many other format changes have occurred since then2. 
We think that this consideration favors the use of structural econometric models 
in order to compare auctions’ revenue-generating properties, because they do not 
require to obtain results under different auction settings.
Our second motivation is that of comparing the findings of the structural 
model with those of the reduced form equations based on the results of “natural 
experiments” with a view to assess their consistency. The Mexican case readily 
lends itself for this purpose because there are two previous empirical studies using 
that technique. One of them is Umlauf (1993) –perhaps one of the best known 
auction studies– that analyzes the auctions of Certificados de la Tesorería de la 
Federación (CETES) carried out during the period 1986-1991. This study’s best-
known conclusion is that after Mexico instituted discriminatory auctions instead of 
uniform pricing auctions in 1989, bidders’ profits decreased and seller’s revenues 
increased accordingly. The other study is Laviada et al. (1997) who have reached 
the same conclusion in their analysis of the period 1995-1997, which covers the 
change back to the discriminatory auction format that took place in November 
of 1995. This is the auction format that has been used to sell the CETES since 
then (of course the problems of interpreting parameters obtained from reduced 
form equations, best summarized as the Lucas’ critique, ought to be regarded as 
a severe warning against drawing conclusions on what policymakers should have 
done in the light of these two studies’ results)3.
1 For instance, in September 1991, in the wake of Solomon Brothers’ admissions of deliberate and 
repeated violations of Treasury auction rules, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the 
Securities Exchange Commission undertook a joint review of the government securities market. Among 
a broad range of issues, the report addressed the need to (i) strengthen enforcement of Treasury’s auc-
tion rules, (ii) automate the auctions, (iii) introduce potential changes in Treasury’s auction technique 
and debt management policies, and (iv) define the role of primary dealers. In such Joint Report, the 
three agencies considered that any degradation in the smooth functioning of the government securities 
market would result in higher costs to the taxpayer; at that time, they estimated that an increase in 
financing costs of only one basis point would cost taxpayers over $ 300 million each year.
2 Perhaps the best-documented format switch occurred after 1994, this time from the discriminatory 
to the uniform one, occurred again in the United States in 1999, after carrying out an explicit series 
of experiments on auction formats. For details, see Malvey et al. (1995) and Malvey and Archibald 
(1998).
3 Nonetheless, the Mexican Treasury has been using the uniform format to issue securities with ma-
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Assessing consistency between the two methods may be useful because 
constructing structural theoretical models or estimating their empirical counter-
part are not easy tasks. In what respects treasury securities auctions, the time lag 
existing between Robert Wilson’s (1979) proposal of the share auction model 
and any empirical counterparts that we can estimate is a very good illustration 
of this. Therefore, reduced forms will remain in use as a first approximation to 
understand complex economic settings and integrate theory and econometrics in 
future structural models4.
For our analysis, we estimate the FVP’s structural econometric model, 
which is an empirical counterpart to Wilson’s share auction model and which 
many authors consider a good theoretical approximation of the treasury securi-
ties auction’s context5. We use a data set construed based on the public results of 
180 CETES primary auctions carried out between January 2001 and April 2002, 
and published on Banco de México’s website. The data includes: (i) securities’ 
characteristics, (ii) summary statistics of auctions, and (iii) anonymous distribution 
of prices and quantities of asked and allocated bids. As several other central banks 
publish auction results in the same fashion (given that they face similar restrictions 
in what respects revealing bidders’ identity and storing data), this approach may 
also be applicable in other cases.
Before briefly summarizing our results, let us point out one distinctive feature 
of the FPV model. Its statistical inference method relies on the Euler condition 
implied by the optimization problem of a bidder in a discriminatory price auction; 
so although we may assume that an equilibrium strategy exists and all bidders 
use it, it is not necessary to know the equilibrium’s explicit form. However, the 
method requires a parametric framework to evaluate and compare the auctions’ 
performance, with the advantage that this always enables us to rank auctions in 
terms of their revenue. In contrast, structural models that are distribution free and 
solve for the equilibrium bidding strategies usually require bidder-specific data 
(Armantier and Sbai, 2003; Hortacsu, 2002 and 2002a; Kang and Puller, 2007), 
which in turn is more difficult to obtain6.
Our estimation results of the FPV model suggest, once again, that in Mexico the 
uniform price auction produces more revenues than the discriminatory price auction. 
Revenues from the CETES discriminatory auctions carried out during the period from 
January 2001 to April 2002 totaled 79,767.05 billion pesos. Contrasting with this, 
revenues from the corresponding hypothetical uniform auctions are 80,918.47 billion 
pesos. This difference in revenue is statistically significant. When we disaggregate 
the data by maturity, we also find that the discriminatory price auction yields higher 
revenues than the uniform price auction in the case of short term 28-day CETES, 
4 See, for example, Orellana et al. (2007).
5 Back and Zender (1993) and Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) provide more detailed explanations 
on the similarities between treasury securities auctions and Wilson’s share auction model.
6 In fact, a handbook for developing government bond markets of the World Bank and the IMF contains 
the following recommendation: “As much aggregate information as possible should be disclosed after 
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while for the longer term –91, 182 and 364-day CETES– the uniform price format 
yields the highest revenue. The revenue ranking runs counter to FPV’s findings for 
French Treasury securities auctions (even though the two countries’ auctions have 
several features in common), but coincides with the previous results for the 28-day 
CETES auctions obtained through the reduced equation technique.
To investigate whether the driving force behind the above-mentioned results 
relates to the type of bid shading that occurs in response to market uncertainty, we 
resort to four exercises that use the results of both the structural and reduced form 
estimations to greatest possible advantage. First, we compare the conditional variance 
of the value obtained in our exercise, which we can interpret as a higher degree of 
uncertainty in the good’s value, as compared to the one obtained by FPV, and find 
that ours is considerably larger. Second, we look at the relationship between the 
gains of employing the uniform format and the volatility of the securities resale 
price for the 28-day CETES in our estimations, as well as in the results of Umlauf 
(1993) and Laviada et al. (1997) that cover different periods. We find that this 
relationship –that can also be ascribed to market uncertainty– is positive. Third, 
the cross maturity comparison of our estimations shows the same pattern. Fourth, 
a simulation re-estimating FPV’s model using a value signal constructed with a 
higher variance (in effect, noisier) than the original data, shows that: (i) parameters 
obtained are consistent with the signals being less informative; and (ii) revenues 
obtained from the hypothetical uniform auctions exceed those from the observed 
discriminatory auctions by an even larger proportion than before. Thus, the four 
exercises point to market uncertainty having a role in the results.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the CETES auction 
framework and the dataset. Section 3, for the sake of completeness, presents 
Wilson’s (1979) share auction model and the FPV (2004) estimation technique. 
Section 4 addresses the estimation results and the revenue comparisons between 
the discriminatory and the uniform format. Section 5 performs exercises to explore 
the possible impact of market uncertainty in the results. Finally, section 6 sum-
marizes some conclusions and possible extensions.
2.  A Description of CETES’ Auctions and Data
The sales mechanism of the Mexican Treasury securities has been modi-
fied several times since the CETES were first issued in 1978. For purposes of our 
analysis, we focus our attention on the institutional framework that prevailed in 
our data period, which is between January 2001 and April 2002:
•	 Only	brokerage	houses,	banks	and	investment	funds	based	in	Mexico	can	
bid and acquire treasury securities7.
7 Other agents specifically authorized by Banco de México, the Central Bank, can also bid and buy 
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•	 Banco	de	México	publishes	on	its	website	the	primary	auction	announce-
ment, after 12:00 a.m. of the last market day of the week immediately before 
the auction takes place8, 9. It provides information as to the securities and 
auction’s characteristics: securities’ date of issue, announcement number, 
and issue’s identification number, and auction format and maximum amount 
tendered.
•	 Primary	auctions	can	be	of	either	the	uniform	price	or	the	discrimina-
tory price format (the latter was the one in place during the period under 
study).
•	 Bidding	for	CETES	is	only	through	competitive	bids,	indicating	the	amount	
and discount rate at which the bidder is willing to buy the securities ten-
dered10. Each bidder may submit one or more bids in the same auction. 
Bidders are to submit their bids no later than 13.30 p.m. on the second 
market day immediately before the securities’ issue date.
•	 The	sum	of	any	bidder’s	quantity	bids	for	any	auction	must	not	exceed	
60% of the maximum amount tendered.
•	 All	bids	are	obligatory	and	irreversible	for	the	bidder.	If	a	bidder	does	not	
pay for the securities allocated to him in full, Banco de México can cancel 
the sale for the unpaid securities amount. It can also ban the bidder from 
participating in subsequent auctions.
•	 The	weighted	allocation	rate	is	determined	based	on	the	allocated	bids.
•	 At	any	auction,	the	Treasury	can	determine	the	maximum	discount	rate	
at which it is willing to place the auction securities. Higher discount rates 
are not met in those cases (though, this right was not exercised in any of 
the auctions of the period under study)11.
•	 Banco	de	México	notifies	the	auctions’	results	to	each	bidder	no	later	than	
10:30 a.m. of the market day immediately after the auctions take place 
through the bank’s service counter to meet account holders needs12. In ad-
dition, it announces the auctions’ general results no later than 18:30 p.m. 
of the day of the auction through its website.
•	 The	Security	Safe	Custody	Institute	delivers	the	securities	allocated	through	
each bidder’s account13 on the issue date. Brokerage houses and banks must 
pay for the securities through the institute’s system. Other institutions must 
pay for the securities through a brokerage house or a bank.
8 Mexico’s central bank website address is http://www.banxico.org.mx.
9 These announcements, in turn, follow the quarterly issuance calendar of the Ministry of Finance.
10 Discount rates must be expressed in percentage points, up to two decimal points, in yearly terms 
and based on years of 360 days.
11 After September 2002 the rule is that the Treasury only can declare the whole auction deserted if 
discount rates are too high, but this new rule has not been used either.
12 Sistema de Atención a Cuentahabientes del Banco de México (SIAC-Banxico), in Spanish.
13 Instituto para el Depósito de Valores (S. D. INDEVAL). INDEVAL is the only firm in México 
authorized to operate as a depository of securities. The services it must provide include custody, 
administration and transfer of securities, as well as operation compensation and liquidation.8 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
Although the main CETES auction features agree in very broad terms 
with Wilson’s (1979) share auction model and the statistical inference method 
of FPV, so we can assume that bidders are risk neutral, and the good on sale is 
divisible and has the same value for all bidders –in spite that it is unknown at 
the start of the auction–, there is one institutional feature of the CETES auctions 
that does not match those models. As in many security markets, after the primary 
auction there is a buy option for market makers that permits them to acquire more 
securities by placing non-competitive bids14. Actually, this mechanism is also 
in place for the French Treasury auctions analyzed by FPV. As a point in favor 
of this exercise, we can state that there are two aspects of the CETES auctions 
making them resemble Wilson’s model much more than the French Treasury 
auctions. These aspects are: i) CETES bidders at the primary auction are only 
allowed to submit competitive bids; and ii) the securities allocated through the 
market makers’ buy option represent a much smaller proportion of the total 
number of securities’ that are placed by the Mexican Treasury as compared to 
those placed by the French Treasury.
CETES are zero coupon bonds issued and liquidated by the Federal 
Government at the maturity date. Even today, they are among the most important 
public debt instruments of the Federal Government, with a high preponderance 
in the Mexican money and stock markets. The most common maturity dates have 
been 28, 91, 182 and 364 days. Our database derives from the general results 
of 180 CETES primary auctions that Banco de México publishes weekly at its 
website. The data includes (i) securities’ characteristics, (ii) auction’s summary 
statistics, and (iii) anonymous distribution of prices and quantities of both asked 
and allocated bids. During the period under study, 28 and 91-day CETES were 
auctioned weekly, 182-day CETES were auctioned every 2 weeks, and 364-day 
CETES every 4 weeks15. In turn, the source of the CETES secondary market 
prices is the price vector that Banco de México publishes on its website.
14 We sketched a two-stage model that takes into account this buy option and estimated the FPV model 
using only a sample that would be consistent with Wilson’s share auction model; that is, the sample of 
primary auctions after which the market makers’ buy option was empty. This exercise suggests that 
the characterization of the CETES as a share auction was adequate because the securities allocations 
through the market makers’ buy option have been a small proportion of the total amount issued by 
the Mexican Treasury. However, the potential asymmetry among bidders that the market makers’ buy 
option may introduce did not affect the estimated parameters substantially across the samples. A more 
detailed description of Mexico’s market makers mechanism, the model sketch and the estimation results 
are available in Spanish in the working paper version of this paper, Castellanos and Oviedo, 2004.
15 CETES issues with maturity of 27, 90, 168, 182, 335 or 363 days, that result from computing the 
securities’ maturity according to the number of market days and from the practice of “reopening” the 
182 and 235 days issues to improve their liquidity, for presentation purposes are grouped with the 
closest of the 4 basic issues.Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 9
TABLE 1




Number of Auctions 180
   28-day  65 36.11
   91-day  65 36.11
   182-day  33 18.33
   364-day  17 9.45
Number of Bidders 3,581
Number of Bids 13,393
   Allocated totally or partially 4,506 33.64
   Not allocated 8,887 66.36
Total amount issued by the Treasury
(in thousands of pesos) 879,249,141
   Non-competitive bids in the buy option for
   market makers 55,860,991 6.35
   Competitive bids in the primary auction 823,388,150 93.65
Source: Author’s own calculations based on public results of 180 CETES primary auctions carried 
out between January 2001 and April 2002.
Table 1 shows the basic statistics of our dataset, involving 3,581 “different” 
auction bidders that submitted 13,392 competitive bids totaling approximately 
2,675,255 million pesos. Of these bids, 33.64% were allocated either totally or 
partially and 66.36% were rejected. The total amount of CETES issued by the 
Treasury is approximately 879,249 million pesos. Therefore, 93.65% of this 
amount was placed through competitive bids in the primary auction and only 
6.35% was placed through market makers’ non-competitive bids in the buy option. 
FPV report that these last two figures for the French Treasury securities are 91% 
and 8%, respectively (with the 1% residual placed through non-competitive bids 
received in the primary auctions). Hence, their argument that this amount of non-
competitive bidding is too small to have an effect on the assumptions that support 
their estimation method can also hold in the case of the CETES auctions.
Table 2 shows summary statistics per auction of the variables suggested by 
FPV for the empirical estimation. Statistics calculated for the whole sample are 
comparable to the French securities auction data as reported by the authors of the 
FPV model. The most obvious difference between the two samples relates to the 
securities’ average maturity, which in Mexico is shorter than one year and in France 
is longer than 10 years. In general, the longer that the securities’ maturity dates 
are, the higher the nominal yield is and the lower the secondary market price is. 
Therefore, for similar maturity dates, securities’ secondary market prices seem to 
be higher in Mexico than in France. On the other hand, the variables for number of 10 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
bidders, number of bids and cover (defined as the ratio of total amount of quantity 
bids to total amount issued by the Treasury), which measure the degree of auction 
competition, do not vary much across CETES with different maturity.
TABLE 2

























Mean 19.46 73.92 4,538,043 96.84 10.30 109.18 3.24
Standard Deviation 6.13 19.59 674,815 3.14 3.48 94.22 0.90
Max 91 145 5,200,000 100 18.38 364 7.31
Min 12 35 3,300,000 84.81 5.26 27 1.68
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
28-day CETES
Mean 18.90 72.12 4,500,000 99.30 9.13 28.00 3.02
Standard Deviation 2.70 16.54 0 0.25 3.07 0.28 0.81
Max 27.00 107.00 4,500,000 100.00 16.61 29.00 5.66
Min 15.00 42.00 4,500,000 98.74 5.65 27.00 1.70
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
91-day CETES
Mean 19.63 78.71 5,200,000 97.62 9.74 91.00 3.60
Standard Deviation 3.41 18.68 0 0.78 2.93 0.28 0.87
Max 29.00 128.00 5,200,000 100.00 17.01 92.00 6.37
Min 13.00 35.00 5,200,000 95.80 5.92 90.00 2.32
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
182-day CETES
Mean 18.61 68.86 3,300,000 94.91 10.59 178.96 3.38
Standard Deviation 3.11 20.39 0 1.41 2.75 5.83 1.17
Max 25.00 112.00 3,300,000 97.51 16.53 182.00 7.31
Min 13.00 40.00 3,300,000 92.11 6.49 168.00 1.78
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
364-day CETES
Mean 19.00 78.00 4,646,154 89.16 11.20 348.77 3.02
Standard Deviation 3.34 27.70 161,325 2.12 2.18 14.52 0.97
Max 25.00 145.00 5,000,000 92.23 15.36 364.00 4.45
Min 14.00 43.00 4,500,000 85.61 8.34 335.00 1.68
Observations 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Note: *  Weighted allocation rate of the primary auction.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the public results of 180 CETES primary auctions carried 
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Table 3 shows the summary statistics per bidder and per bid. In each auction, 
each bidder submitted four competitive bids on average; that is, four combinations of 
amount and discount rate at which they are willing to buy the securities. According 
to FPV, bidders in France and Portugal submit three bids on average, while in 
Turkey they submit seven bids on average. If a bidder distributes his individual 
demand into a larger number of bids as an optimal strategy to cope with market 
value uncertainty, these numbers suggest that the bidders participating in the 
Mexican auctions perceive a more uncertain environment than those participating 
in the French or Portuguese auctions, but less uncertain than those participating 
in the Turkish auctions16.
TABLE 3





Number of bids per bidder 3.85 0.75 7.69 0.64 3,581
Demanded quantity per bidder
(Thousands of pesos)
770,628 215,108 1,461,471 205,625 3,581
Demanded quantity per bid
(Thousands of pesos)
204,300 61,088 418,286 116,342 13,393
Allocated bids per
winning bidder
2.04 0.82 4.09 0.12 4,506
Allocated quantity per winning
bidder (Thousands of pesos)
576,622 531,294 2,600,000 183,333 4,506
Allocated quantity per winning
bid (Thousands of pesos)
432,918 571,619 2,600,000 64,706 4,506
Price bid 96.68 3.19 99.57 84.55 13,393
Highest price bid – Lowest price bid 0.38 0.42 2.58 0.04 13,393
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the public results of 180 CETES primary auctions carried 
out between January 2001 and April 2002.
In turn, the average quantity bid per bidder is 770.63 million pesos, and the 
average winning number of bids per winning bidder is 576.62, so each winning 
bidder receives on average 74.82% of his quantity of bids. However, the rest of the 
data does not support this winning expectation. The mean and standard deviation 
of the demanded quantity per bid are 204.29 and 61.09, respectively, while those 
16 See Gordy (1996) for a more detailed presentation of this idea.12 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
of the allocated quantity per winning bid are 432.92 and 571.62, respectively. 
Since these distributions of variables are truncated at zero, the latter statistics seem 
more consistent with a pattern of asymmetric information among the bidders17. 
Specifically, it would seem that bidders submitting large bids have more informa-
tion about the good’s value than bidders that submit small bids. Therefore, large 
bids win more often than small bids18. Although such asymmetry is not consistent 
with Wilson’s model and we find it somewhat awkward, since we have no way 
of telling large from small bidders in our dataset we must assume symmetry for 
the rest of the analysis.
3.  Theoretical Model and Econometric Technique
For the sake of completeness, this section briefly outlines Wilson’s share 
model as presented in FPV along with the latter’s econometric technique. However, 
readers are encouraged to refer to FPV’s article for a more detailed discussion 
about the model’s assumptions and properties19. Let us consider the auction of 
a perfectly divisible good among n ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders. The good’s value is 
the same for all bidders but unknown when the auction starts. We assume that the 
good’s value follows a distribution function Fv (v) = Pr (V < v). Before the auc-
tion, each bidder i = 1, …, n receives a private signal about the good’s value. This 
signal is a realization of the random variable Si. We assume signals S1, …, Sn to 
be independently and identically distributed given V.
The distribution of Si given V is the same for all bidders and denoted as 
FS | V (s | v) = Pr (Si ≤ s | V = v). The signal received by each bidder is observed   
only by him and not by either the seller or the rest of the bidders. The number of 
bidders, n, and the distributions Fv (.) and FS | V (.) are common knowledge.
Each bidder must submit his bid, consisting of the fraction of the good 
that he requests at each price, to the seller. The price and quantity combinations 
constitute his individual demand. Adding up all individual demands, the seller 
can determine the market equilibrium price; that is, the price at which aggregate 
demand adds up to one.
Let us define xi (.,.) as bidder i’s strategy in the primary auction. This strat-
egy is a function of the good’s price p and of the signal si, so that when bidder i 
gets the signal Si= si, his bid specifies that he will demand a share xi (p, si). In a 
symmetric optimal strategies equilibrium xi (p, si) = xi (.,.) for all i.
17 Notice that asymmetry across bidders may also be the result of different costs of obtaining or 
placing customers offers.
18 For the 28-day CETES auctions of the period 1986-1991, see Umlauf (1993), whose data permits 
distinguishing bidders’ sizes and also provides evidence suggesting that there is asymmetric informa-
tion between large and small bidders. However, it should be noticed that, due to the consolidation of 
the banking industry in Mexico, there are fewer but larger banks in the period analyzed.
19  More details about the asymptotic properties of FPV’s semi parametric two-stage estimator are 
also available in Newey and McFadden (1994).Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 13
Along with this notation, the equation that defines the market equilibrium 
of the primary auction under the uniform price format as a function of the equi-
librium price p0 is written as:
(1)  xp sy ps ji
ji
00 1 ,, ( )+ ( ) =
≠ ∑
This equation depends on bidder i’s signal and on the signals received 
by each one of the other bidders, which are unknown to bidder i. As a result, the 
equilibrium price p0 is also unknown to bidder i. However, since bidder i know the 
probability distribution function from which he extracts signals and the function xi 
(p, si), he can determine the conditional distribution of the random variable P 0:
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If a uniform price auction format is employed, bidder i’s expected benefit 
when he resorts to strategy y (.,.)  and the good’s value and equilibrium price are, 
respectively, v and p0 is:












where the expected value is with respect to V given Si= si. The strategy x (.,.) indeed 
is optimal if the maximum of equation (3) is attained at y (.,.) = x (.,.). A solution 
to this optimization can be characterized by resorting to calculus of variations. 

























where partial derivatives of H with respect to p and y are evaluated at y = x (p, si). 
On the other hand, if a discriminatory price auction format is employed, bidder 
i’s expected benefit becomes:
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and it has a corresponding empirical counterpart, as derived by FPV, written as:
(7) 
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where the first expected value is with respect to the signals S1,…, Sn (the random 
variable P0 only depends on these signals), the second one is with respect to V given 
S1,…, Sn, the third one is with respect to P 0, and 1 ⋅ {} is the indicator function. This 
condition is satisfied for all p ∈ [0, ∞]. Then the objective is to find an estimator 
of θ 0, the true value of θ, defined as the minimum of the empirical counterpart of 
the Euler condition derived from the bidders utility maximization problem. Using 
this condition to estimate the structural parameters of the model makes it essential 
to find a way to compute the conditional expectation EE VS sS ns n (, ,, 11 =… = ( )
which is an unbiased estimate of V. The problem is that we do not observe the 
signals of the bidders s1,…, sn. But we do observe their bids, so to overcome this 
problem FPV suggest assuming that bidders’ strategies are strictly decreasing in 
their signal, si. With this assumption, the authors can use observed bid functions 
instead of the unobserved signals to form the above conditional expectation. In 
particular, if bid strategies, x (p, si), are strictly decreasing in the signals, si, then 
the quantiles of x (p, si) can be equated to quantiles of si to “invert” an observed 
bid x (p, si) to find its corresponding signal, si. This could well be deemed a very 
strong assumption that ought to be tested against data. Unfortunately, our data is 
not rich enough to permit it, so we adopt this working assumption and leave its 
testing for future research.
The estimation is carried through a two stage semi-parametric method 
that exploits the results of a set of L auctions that exhibit observed heterogeneity 
across them in terms of a number of participants Nl and of a vector of auction 
characteristics Zl
20. For auction l with characteristics zl and nl bidders, the Euler 
equation can be rewritten in terms of auction-specific variables as:
(8)  
01 1 11







−− ⋅≤ {} =
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00 1 n nZ z ll , = {}
20 To this end, the random variables (Nl, Zl), l = 1, …, L, are assumed to be independently and identi-
cally distributed. The good’s value in the l-th auction, Vl and the signal received by bidder i in the 
auction l, Sil (dependent on Vl), are assumed to be dependent of Zl and independent of Nl. The value 
realizations of V1,..,VL, conditional on Zl, are independently and identically distributed. S1l,..Snl are 
independent conditional on Zl and Vl, and the signals Sil and Si´l´ are also independent conditional on 
Zl and Zl′ for all l ≠ l′. In addition, the respective conditional distribution functions of Vl, and Sil are 
denoted FV | Z (∙ | z; θ1) and FS | V, Z (∙ | v, z; θ2), where θ1 and θ2  are parameter vectors. From these two 
distributions, the one for Sil given Zl = z, FS | Z (∙ | z; θ), where θ = (θ1′, θ2′)′ , can be determined.Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 15
where the random variable Pl
0 represents the equilibrium price at auction l and the 
first expected value is taken with respect to Sil,…, Snl,l  given Nl = nl, and Zl=zl.
This condition must hold for all p ∈ [0, ∞] and all l = 1,.., L.
In Stage 1 the distribution of optimal bids, G (x | n, z; p), is estimated non 
parametrically from the observed bids using Kernel estimation methods21. Let 
K(.,.) be a Kernel and hN and hZ be the bandwidth parameters –i.e., hZ being the 
vector of bandwidth parameters for each characteristic z-. Then a non-parametric 
estimator of the distribution of optimal bidding strategies G (∙ | ∙, ∙, ; p)  is:















































Once this distribution function is obtained, for any θ, the unobserved 
signals appearing in the above equation are replaced with the estimated inverse 
demand functions (since   xx pS nz F G xnzpz il SZ
− − ( ) = − ( ) ( )
1 1 1 ,, ,,; ˆ ,; ; | θ θ  and also 
sx xpSn z il il =
−1 0 (,,, ,; ) θ )22. Then, the following empirical counterpart for the right 
hand side of equation (8) is considered:
(10)  mx xnnp pz pn lLp L L (, ..., ,, ..., ,, ..., ,, . 11 1 1
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
Stage 2 consists of minimizing with respect to θ  the squared sum of a fixed 
number T of empirical moments (FVP choose T equal to the number of auctions 
in the sample)23. In effect:
(11)  ˆ min ( , ..., ,, ..., , θ
θ
= Arg m x x nn p pt nL p L lt
2
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At the first estimation stage, the optimal bidding strategies’ distribution 
function is estimated using the Epanechnikov Kernel. This kind of estimation 
requires a vector of observations, denoted as z = (z1, z2, z3), to evaluate the Kernel 
for each of the variables z. Hence, the Kernel estimator is defined as follows:
21 Pagan and Ullah (1999).
22 This follows from the definition of  G x nzp x pS N Z xN nZ z il l l l l , ; Pr , , , ; , ( ) = ( ) ≤ = = ( ) θ
0 , assuming 
that Sil, and Nl are conditionally independent, when the optimal strategy is a decreasing function of 
the signal.
23 Though, FPV note that since equation (9) is satisfied for an infinite number of prices, there exists 
an infinite number of moments and, for each of these theoretical moments, there exists an empirical 

































































where K(u) = 0.75 (1 – u2)1{|u|≤1} and hN, h1Z, h2Z, and h3Z  are bandwidth 
parameters24.
Next, it is necessary to choose the parametric specifications for the signal and 
valuation distribution functions. The distribution function of Vl given Zl = zl is:
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where αl = (1, zl) · α and βl = (1, zl) · β · Γ (·) is the gamma function, α and β are 
parameter vectors of 4×1 dimension, and γ  is a scalar. If  γ  = 1 the distribution 
described in equation (13) is a gamma distribution with parameters αl  and βl, 
while if γ ≠ 1 then Vl
γ  follows a gamma distribution with parameters αl  and βl. 
Note also that θl = (α ′, β ′, γ ).
The probability distribution of Sil  given Vl = v and Zl  = z, is specified with 
the exponential distribution:
(14)  Fs vz sv SVZl ll |, ,; exp θ
γ




where γ  is the same parameter that appears in the conditional distribution of Vl. 
In this case, the conditional expected value and the conditional variance of Sil are 
independent of zl. So the complete vector of parameters is: θ = (α ′, β ′, γ ); that is   
θ, which has 9×1 dimension.
Under these two specifications proposed by FPV, the conditional expecta-
tion of Vl that appears in the empirical moment m(.) is:
(15) 

































































24 To calculate this expression, as FPV we resort to the rule of thumb to define the bandwidth para-
meters as follows: hi = 2.214s / L1/7, for i = {N, Z}, where s is the standard deviation of variable i and 
L is the number of observations. According to hi, bandwidth parameters differ across the variables if 
they show different variability in the data.Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 17
Once this expression is appropriately substituted into equation (11), we can 
proceed with the second stage estimation through generalized methods of moments 
of θ 0 , the true value of θ. FPV select the value of T equal to the number of auc-
tions or stop-out prices. The corresponding standard errors are computed with the 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix derived in the Appendix C of FPV.
Given these estimated values of θ  and using equation (11), E (Vl | Zl = zl)   
can be computed as follows:
(16)  EVZz vf vzdv ll l
l
l



















FPV’s specifications have the property of allowing us to obtain closed form solu-
tions for optimal strategies and equilibrium prices in the uniform price auction. 
In fact, Wilson’s share auction with the uniform format has multiple equilibria 
and – depending on which equilibrium is played – the price in the auction may 
be anything between the seller’s reservation price and the “true value” (Back and 
Zender, 1993). Despite this, the optimal strategy derived by FVP actually is the 
unique equilibrium strategy in the class of demand functions that are linear in the 
individual signal’s value, under the above distributional assumptions25:







































































That is, the closed-form expressions of the optimal strategy in a uniform 
auction that result from the parametric specifications (13) and (14). Then the 
equilibrium stop-out price at the l–th uniform price auction, as a function of the 
estimated signals and parameters is:
(18) 





































25 Such class of linear demand functions has the form  x p S n z a pnz b pnz s il l l l l l l , , , ; ( ,, ; ) ( , , ; ) θ θ θ ( ) = + l l , 
with the only restriction that functions a(.,.,.;.) and b(.,.,.;.) are such that x(.,.,.,.;.) is decreasing in p 
and sil.18 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
Therefore, we can obtain the stop-out price replacing θ and sil in the above 
expression by their estimates. Then we can compute the hypothetical revenue from 
uniform price auction l as the product of the equilibrium price times the amount 
of bonds auctioned, and the total hypothetical income under the uniform auction 
derives from the summation over all the sample auctions.
4.  Results
4.1  Parameters
For our estimations, the dimension of zl is equal to 3 and includes the 
secondary market price (in pesos), the maturity (in days) and the nominal yield 
(in percentage) as shown in Table 226. Our calculated values are hN = 20.6216, 
h1z = 3.3344, h2z = 3.6252, and h3z = 99.8950. Notice that these values agree with 
the data of Table 5, because the number of bidders and nominal yield exhibit a 
higher variance than the secondary market price and maturity.
The number of moments we chose to estimate equation 10 is T = 180.27 
Table 4 shows our estimates. All parameters are significant and different from 
zero at 5% confidence level.
TABLE 4
SECOND STAGE ESTIMATE OF θ
Estimate of alpha: Coefficient Standard Error
Constant –15.2771 0.97630
Secondary market price 148.4281 0.92758
Nominal yield –12.5593 0.11267
Maturity (Divided by 364) –4.7492 0.43610
Estimate of beta:
Constant –29.8005 0.63808
Secondary market price 151.1429 0.60659
Nominal yield 12.9369 0.07355
Maturity (Divided by 364)  0.3889 0.28267
Gamma 118.7335 0.66655
We evaluate the derivatives of equation 16 with respect to each of the variables 
at the sample mean of the characteristics. The values obtained for the derivatives 
with respect to secondary market price, nominal yield, and maturity are –0.0804, 
26 The nominal yield is the weighted average rate of allocation.
27 In FPV, T = 45. Since this number may be deemed somewhat small for a GMM estimation, we 
decided to take into account the information of all auctions in our dataset.Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 19
–0.1769, and -0.1265, respectively28. Although the first sign is not very intuitive, 
the last two are because we usually expect securities’ value to increase as the 
secondary market price is higher and the nominal yield and maturity are lower.
4.2  Conditional mean and variance.
The  average  estimated  expected  value  given  the  signals, 
EVSs S s Zz ll il nll n ll l 1 =… = = ( ) ,, , , is equal to 0.9910 and the average value, 
EVZz ll l = ( ), is equal to 1.0004. In turn, the average spread between 
EVSs S s Zz ll il nll n ll l 1 =… = = ( ) ,, ,  and the stop-out price is 0.0237, while the 
spread between  EVZz ll l = ( ) and the stop-out price is 0.033229. Notice that it 
seems more natural that the spread increases with the good’s value because, if 
the good is valuable, competition should be stronger and the resulting stop-out 
price should be lower. However, the data indicate that this is the case only for the 
average expected value.
4.3  Comparing revenues
The total hypothetical revenue obtained is 80,918.48 billion pesos, while 
the revenue observed in the discriminatory auction is 79,767.05 billion pesos. 
Hence, if the Federal Government had used the uniform price mechanism to auc-
tion its securities instead of the discriminatory price mechanism, it would have 
raised an additional 1,151.42 billion pesos, that is, the revenue would have been 
1.44% higher.
In order to test the significance of these estimates, we calculate the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals of the difference in revenue per auction 
(Table 5)30, and find a significant difference between the discriminatory and 
the uniform auction. The bootstrapped mean of the difference is approximately 
6 million pesos, with an upper bound of 8.44 million pesos and a lower bound 
of 4.50 million pesos.
28 These values are lower in magnitude than those calculated by FPV for the French securities auc-
tions. The difference in magnitude of these results seems to be related to the magnitude of gamma 
and of the constants. For instance, both of the two gammas calculated in this exercise are higher than 
the one estimated in FPV.
29 Estimations of  EVS sS s Z z l lil nll n l l l 1 = … = = ( ) , , , , the secondary market prices, the stop-out 
prices, and  EVZ z l l l = ( ) for all auctions, computed from the estimators obtained for each sample, 
are omitted for the sake of briefness but are available from the authors upon request.
30 The bootstrap procedure was carried out by making random sub-samples of the different auctions 
several times and calculating the difference in revenue each time given the estimators. With this, we 
were able to construct the distribution of the difference in revenue and its interval at 95% of this dis-
tribution. A difference in revenue equal to zero was the null hypothesis, which was rejected.20 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
TABLE 5
MEAN OF DIFFERENCE IN REVENUE – DISCRIMINATORY MINUS 
ESTIMATED UNIFORM





Lower bound Upper bound
–6.3968 –7.4383 –8.4476 –4.5051
In addition, we calculated the bootstrapped interval several times and found 
that their figures do not change across calculations. The aggregated difference 
seems small, but it is considerably negative in each auction. The estimated density 
function for the difference in revenue is shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
BOOTSTRAP DENSITY FUNCTION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN REVENUE 





























Sample I - Millions of pesos
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There are two other interesting features of these results. First, the uniform 
auction’s revenue superiority differs across CETES with different maturity. Second, 
for all maturities this revenue superiority diminishes throughout the analysis period. 
Actually, in the case of the 28-day CETES, the discriminatory scheme obtains 
higher revenues than the uniform one. Benefits derived from the discriminatory 
auction increase through time, from 0.3% to 1.35%. For the rest of the CETES, 
the uniform price auction is higher in revenue. In the 91-day CETES auctions, 
the benefits involved in implementing a uniform price auction go from 2.66% to 
a loss of 0.28%. In the 182-day CETES auctions, this benefit falls from 7% to 
1.4%. Finally, benefits from selling the 364-day CETES, when they are at their 
highest, decrease from 10% to 5% (See Figure 2).
FIGURE 2
DIFFERENCE IN REVENUE BETWEEN THE (OBSERVED) DISCRIMINATORY 
AUCTION AND THE (HYPOTHETICAL) UNIFORM AUCTION
a.  28-day CETES 
(percentages) 
b.  91-day CETES 
(percentages) 
 
c.  182- day CETES 
(percentages) 
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The date after which the revenues from discriminatory auctions begin to 
rise in a noticeable manner is May 2001; this date corresponds to the implementa-
tion of new rules for non-competitive bidding in the market makers’ buy option. 
Since we cannot explain this phenomenon within the frame of the analytical 
setting of this paper, let us only state a conjecture regarding the effects of this 
change. These new rules determine the maximum quantity allocation as a function 
of these agents’ competitive bids submitted in the primary auction, featuring a 
small interval around the lowest price (highest rate) that receives an allocation at 
the primary auction, instead of the total amount allocated to it. Setting rules that 
promote stronger competition among market makers may have contributed to a 
more aggressive bidding in the primary auction and, therefore, the differential in 
revenue between the two auction formats may have fallen. Alternatively, the market 
making mechanism may have been becoming more effective in disseminating 
information across the secondary market.
5.  Exploring the Role of Market Uncertainty
5.1  A comparison with the previous results for CETES and French Treasury 
securities auctions
In this model, one possible reason why the uniform price auction may produce 
higher sales revenue than the discriminatory one is that the conditional variance 
of the value obtained in this exercise is considerably higher than the one that FPV 
obtain. We may interpret this as a higher degree of uncertainty in the good’s value, 
which would be a reason for more cautious bidding in the discriminatory auctions 
in Mexico than those in France. In this sense, the values of αl and βl evaluated at 
the sample mean of z can be seen in Table 6. It is important to remember that in 
this case Vl
γ follows a gamma distribution with parameters αl and βl.
TABLE 6











January 2001-April 2002 125.68 117.97 1.0653 0.0090 0.0891
Février,Préget,
and Visser (2004) 3045.04 848.72 3.5878 0.0042 0.0181
Note: Evaluated at the characteristics’ sample mean.
According to the table’s data, the distribution of Vl
γ  in our sample ex-
hibits a higher variance than the one obtained in FPV. We can appreciate this 
higher dispersion in a better manner by looking at the coefficients of variation. Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 23
Therefore, we can state that the Mexican market shows more value uncertainty 
than the French market.
Let us now compare our findings with the previous ones of Umlauf (1993) 
and Laviada et al. (1997) for the 28-day CETES auctions. We construct the vari-
ance of the daily funding rate with government securities over the five-day period 
leading to and including the day on which the auction is conducted –that is, the 
variable used to proxy resale risk and information dispersion in those studies– for 
the periods examined in each of the three studies. For the first two periods, we 
calculate the revenue of the discriminatory format as the product of the amount 
issued times the average allocation price. Next, we estimate the revenue of the 
hypothetical uniform auction as the amount issued times the sum of the average 
allocation price plus the positive mark-up per bid in the uniform auction with re-
spect to the discriminatory format reported by those authors. Finally, we subtract 
the former from the latter to obtain the difference in revenue. Table 7 shows a 
positive relationship between the gains of using the uniform format and market 
uncertainty; that is, the gain is positive in the auctions examined by Umlauf and 
Laviada et al., and negative in those that we examined. In turn, we may connect 
this to higher market volatility in those samples than in ours.
TABLE 7
AUCTION REVENUE AND MARKET VOLATILITY COMPARISON WITH 
























Aug 1986- May 1991
      (Umlauf, 1993) 2.44bp 74 74 0.000% 0.160
Jun 1995- Mar 1997
      (Laviada et al., 1997) 18.96bp 8,558 8,558 0.002% 3.498
Jan 2001-Apr 2002
      (present) – 29,657,590 29,398,573 –0.873% 0.096
Next, we look for this same positive relationship in our cross maturity 
results. As different resale price volatility across CETES maturities are needed for 
this exercise, we construct the variance of resale price with the Enlaces Prebon 
CETES secondary market price index (IEP index)31. In addition, we only look 
31 Enlaces Prebon is one of the main inter-dealer brokerage firms operating in the Mexican Stock 
Market. The IEP index for CETES corresponds to the mean market interest rate at 12:15 a.m., deter-
mined through a survey to 12 participating institutions. The three highest and three lowest reported 24 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
at 17 auctions of each maturity date, because the 364-day CETES are auctioned 
monthly. Table 8 once again shows the positive relationship between the gains 
derived from using the uniform auction format and market volatility in CETES 
with maturities of 28, 91 and 182 days. We think that this is due to a low transac-
tion volume problem affecting issues with longer maturities to a greater extent 
than the resale market for the latter securities that is, in fact, less uncertain than 
those of the shorter term maturities32.
TABLE 8

















28 days 7,572.253 7,518.962 –0.70% 0.052
91 days 8,564.527 8,690.297 1.47% 0.064
182 days 5,321.119 5,511.703 3.58% 0.067
364 days 7,141.314 7,807.403 9.33% 0.046
5.2  Simulation exercise with noisier value signals
In this section, we test whether market uncertainty affects bidding within 
the structural model framework. First, we generate a more volatile series of the 
secondary market price, and use it to estimate stage 1 signals’ distribution and to 
generate new model parameters.
The new series of secondary market prices is modeled as the observed second-
ary market price with an AR(1) process -conditional on the CETES maturity- plus 
i.i.d. shocks. This model yields a variance of shocks of 2.55 and an autoregressive 
parameter ρ = 0.091. Next, we use the AR(1) approximation method proposed 
by Tauchen (1986) to simulate 180 new data of the secondary market price. We 
assume that the new series has the same variance as that for the period between 
June 1995 and March 1997 analyzed by Laviada et al. (1997); that is, a variance 
of the daily funding rate equal to 3.49 according to Table 14.1. Though this vari-
ance is 55% higher than the one observed in our data set, we can still regard it as 
a conservative simulation in view of the Mexican market experience.
rates are eliminated, so the average rate is constructed from the remaining six reports. The index is 
constructed for CETES with 28, 91, 182, and 364 days maturity since June of 1996.
32  IEP indexes are perception indexes, not executable indexes (there is no intention to buy or sell 
securities at the quoted rates). While this is probably the only public source of CETES secondary prices 
that covers our analysis period, this aspect may be a disadvantage for our purpose.Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 25
Table 9 shows the resulting parameters. We can observe a higher esti-
mated value of the parameter γ, which can be interpreted as consistent with a 
setting in which the bidders face less informative signals. In fact, as the value 
of γ increases Vγ decreases (recall that 0 < V < 1), the distribution of signals, 
F s vz sv SV Z ll l , ,; exp θ
γ
2 1 ( ) =− − 


 collapses. On the other hand, as this happens we 
would expect higher revenues from the uniform price. This is precisely what we 
find: the new total hypothetical revenue obtained from the uniform auction now is 
81,506.33 billion pesos, which not only is 2.1% higher than the revenue observed 
from the discriminatory auctions, but it also exceeds by 0.7% the uniform auction 
revenue that was obtained before.
TABLE 9
SECOND STAGE ESTIMATE OF θ USING A SIMULATED SECONDARY MARKET 
PRICE SERIES DISTRIBUTED WITH MEAN 3.70 AND VARIANCE 3.49
Estimate of alpha: Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 327.1935 0.00000015
  Secondary market price 162.8496 0.00001419
  Nominal yield 20.2399 0.00000151
  Maturity 447.9777 0.00000002
Estimate of beta:
Constant 5.4844 0.00003000
  Secondary market price 34.3807 0.00290531
  Nominal yield 82.8601 0.00030871
  Maturity 2031.6185 0.00000309
Gamma 745.6563 14.10575237
6.  Conclusions
The share auction framework supporting the structural estimation method 
of FPV seems to provide an adequate characterization of Mexico’s CETES auc-
tions during the period under analysis. Although the coefficients are significant 
and have a plausible size, the estimated value of the securities does not seem to be 
too sensitive to changes in the auction characteristics considered. Moreover, the 
sign of some of the coefficients are not very intuitive and differ across the samples 
analyzed. While some small sample bias may explain these findings, a selection 
criterion may be needed to enable us to choose from among a set of several pos-
sible exogenous variables those that can best describe the auction heterogeneity. 
Such development may contribute to raise the power of the estimation procedure 
and extend its applicability to other securities for which there is less data available 
than in the case of the zero coupon bonds, particularly in what respects market 
prices. On the other hand, FPV’s estimation approach relies on specific distribu-26 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 45 (Mayo) 2008
tion functions that yield tractable analytical solutions. However, despite this we 
think that experimenting with other parametric specifications of the value and the 
individual signals may also be desirable in the future, both to assess the method’s 
robustness and, more generally, to study other game theoretic models for which 
no explicit strategies can be found (due to either complexity or lack of data).
Our results indicate that the uniform price auction produces higher CETES 
sales revenue than the discriminatory price auction during the period studied. The 
difference in revenue is 1.68% and is statistically significant. However, some 
back-of the envelope calculations could well be enough to give us some grasp of 
this finding’s economic significance. The average issue size of the sample consti-
tuted by 180 auctions is 4,500 million pesos. This is equal to 2.5% of the overall 
outstanding CETES debt issued by the Mexican Treasury during the period under 
analysis (that is, each week the CETES debt is adjusted by 2.5%). Outstanding 
CETES debt represents 3% of Mexico’s GDP. Therefore, the difference in revenue 
is grossly 0.22% of GDP (0.03*0.025*0.0168*180). Coincidentally, according 
to the Mexico’s Ministry of Finance, the primary fiscal deficit target for the end 
of the year stated in the 2005 Economic Program is precisely 0.22% of GDP!33 
This evidence confirms the previous estimations with reduced form estimations 
for 28-day CETES auctions and provides a robustness check on FPV’s structural 
estimation method (which obtained the opposite revenue ranking for French Treasury 
securities). In addition, we find new evidence that suggests that CETES’ market 
volatility has diminished across the analyzed episodes, which would diminish some 
of the benefits of using the uniform auction format instead of the discriminatory 
one34, 35. As a result, the difference in revenue between auction formats that we 
find in this study is lower than in Umlauf’s or Laviada’s.
We also detect that the difference in revenue between the two auction for-
mats varies across CETES with different maturities. The discriminatory format 
produces higher revenue than the uniform format in the 28-day securities auc-
tions, while the uniform format produces higher revenue than the discriminatory 
format in the 91, 182, and 364 -day securities auctions. This positive relationship 
between the gains of the uniform format and the securities’ maturity coincides 
33 Source: 2005 Economic Program, Ministry of Finance, Mexico, January 3, 2005.
34 Besides market uncertainty, another common argument for the existence of a difference in revenue 
across the discriminatory and the uniform auctions of treasury securities refers to the possibility of 
collusion. Notice that in the case of Mexico, the existence of resale price uncertainty is very agreeable 
with this study’s results. Although we do not look directly into the issue of collusion in repeated auc-
tions, the usual argument is that the uniform format is more susceptible to this problem, which would 
predict the opposite differences in revenue that we would get given the frequency, size, and bidder 
participation conditions of the CETES auctions (see Table 3). Quantity uncertainty, another common 
argument for auction differences in revenue, is not an applicable argument in this case either, due to 
the fact the Mexican Treasury has been publishing, for some years already, a quarterly debt issuance 
calendar in advance.
35 In fact, according to a recent BIS report decreasing bond market volatility is a trend that is observed 
not only in Mexico, but also among several other emerging economies (for more details, see “Financial 
stability and local currency bond markets”, Committee on the Global Financial System Papers No 28, 
BIS, 2007, or Eichengreen, Borensztein and Panizza, 2008).Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities 27
with the practice, by the Mexican Treasury as well as by other countries’ debt 
issuing agencies, of selling securities with short maturity with the discriminatory 
format and long-term securities with the uniform auction format36.
Finally, the results obtained in the simulation exercise shed some light 
on the relevance of market uncertainty when a country chooses an auction 
technique to sell bonds. In this particular example, a bond sale in a market with 
higher level of uncertainty, depicted by private signals featuring higher variance, 
will yield more revenue under a uniform format. However, within the frame of 
a particular technique, it may be interesting to consider uncertainty with respect 
to other characteristics, such as, for instance, the issue size or maturity. Some 
recent theoretical models have not only proposed that quantity uncertainty can 
affect revenue ranking between uniform and discriminatory format, but also that 
some debt issuing agencies deliberately introduce quantity uncertainty in their 
auctions; this is because as bond markets develop, issuing agencies are moving 
towards publishing their calendars in advance. Furthermore, some securities are 
being issued with greater frequencies than others. While these aspects are per-
ceived as desirable, the methodology used in this paper, that is, estimations with 
FPV’s structural model complemented by the kind of simulation exercise that we 
performed in section 5.2, may produce some evidence as to the extent to which 
such aspects may matter. These empirical results set a useful baseline for further 
research in other developing markets.
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